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Board Composition, Family Ownership, Institutional Distance and the Foreign Equity 
Ownership Strategies of MNEs  
 
ABSTRACT 
In much of the developing world, families represent the dominant form of firm 
ownership. This study investigates how this influences equity ownership 
strategies when firms venture abroad. Drawing on agency theory and 
institutional theory, we investigate the direct effect of board composition and 
family ownership on the equity-based ownership strategies of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in their affiliates, and how institutional distance may 
moderate this. Examining foreign affiliates of listed Turkish MNEs, we find that 
a high ratio of independent directors is negatively linked to levels of equity 
ownership of MNE affiliates. We also find that a high ratio of inside directors 
on the board is positively associated with the equity stake of MNEs in their 
affiliates. The significant interaction effect between board composition, family 
ownership and institutional distance helps explain the unexpectedly weak effects 
of institutional distance. 
  
Keywords: Board composition, foreign equity ownership strategy, family 
business, agency theory, institutions, Turkey. 
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Board Composition, Family Ownership, Institutional Distance and the Foreign Equity 
Ownership Strategies of MNEs 
 
1. Introduction 
How do families impact the internationalization activities of firms in which they hold a 
significant stake? This study investigates the effects of board composition and family 
ownership on the equity ownership strategies of multinational enterprises from emerging 
markets (EM MNEs) in their affiliates. Further, we assess the moderating effect of 
institutional distance on this relationship. MNEs may be subject to pressures from a range of 
different institutional regimes, reflecting both investor country of origin and where the foreign 
operations take place. There is an extensive literature on how MNEs behave abroad (Almond 
et al., 2005; Brewster et al., 2008), which has tended to concentrate on the relative infusion of 
policies and practices from the country of origin. Less attention has been accorded to the 
association between the MNE’s internal corporate governance mechanisms and foreign equity 
ownership (e.g. Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Filatotchev et al., 2007; Musteen et al., 2009; 
Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Internal corporate governance reflects both institutions, and the 
strategies dominant owner interests adopt in response to them. When formal regulation is 
weak or uncertain, the nature of the latter is vested with particular importance. Whilst weaker 
institutional coverage may be associated with greater agency problems (La Porta et al. 2000a), 
this does not preclude actors from improvising solutions that secure the best returns possible 
under the circumstances (Lane & Wood 2012). Within an emerging market (EM) context, we 
explore how international investment strategies may be molded by corporate governance 
realities and dominant ownership forms. This study makes extensive use of recent advances in 
institutional theory and develops insights into the implications of family capitalism for key 
players. It further evaluates how internal corporate governance mechanisms intersect with 
external ones in imposing a specific agenda on the firm.  
We combine two key theoretical perspectives in international business research: agency 
theory and institutional theory. Agency theory signifies a challenge to the traditional 
Chandlerian notion of the firm and recasts it as primarily a vehicle for releasing value to the 
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owners. Hence, it favors external and internal corporate governance arrangements that support 
owner primacy and mechanisms for aligning managerial decision-making that maximizes 
short-term returns (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In line with agency theory, it may be argued 
that board composition is a major factor in the strategic planning process of MNEs, by 
affecting their risk perception and approach towards internationalization (Filatotchev & 
Wright, 2011). Consequently, board composition is likely to be a crucial precursor of 
managerial skill to engage in internationalization strategies (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; 
Filatotchev et al., 2007; Filatotchev et al., 2008). However, how boards are composed is likely 
to be closely bound up with the institutional setting.     
Agency theory and institutional theory have appeared as important approaches to 
explain foreign entry strategies of MNEs. Gaur and Delios (2015) argue that institutional 
arrangements impact both on external and internal corporate governance arrangements. 
Building on the tradition of North (1987), Gaur and Delios (2015) cast institutions as 
providers of incentives or disincentives for rational actors, encouraging optimal or sub-
optimal paths of decision making, which can be understood in agency terms. They conclude 
that both ownership concentration and ownership identity mold performance. Those strands of 
institutional theory that see private property rights as the most important regulatory feature 
share the basic concerns of agency theory surrounding the need to reign in managers and 
prioritize the release of shareholder value (La Porta et al., 2000a), enabling syntheses between 
these two traditions (Gaur & Delios, 2015). From an integrated perspective, it can be assumed 
that risk preferences and other interests of decision-makers, such as board members, are 
shaped by institutional distinctions between home and host countries. Consequently, the 
predicted effects of board composition on the entry mode choices of MNEs are determined 
somewhat by institutional distance. Apart from the separate effects of board composition and 
institutional distance on entry strategies, we also investigate whether the institutional distance 
between home and host countries has a moderator effect on the relationship between board 
composition and MNE entry strategy. However, it could be argued that the relationship 
between institutions and structures is a two way one, and that actors will undertake actions 
that not only respond to, but in many instances bypass or seek to remold those institutional 
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arrangements not to their liking (Lane & Wood, 2009). The latter forms a central concern of 
this paper. 
We focus on an EM setting, given that in such contexts institutions are less closely 
coupled or aligned, which might provide more opportunities for norm entrepreneurs to 
challenge and reform existing ways of doing things (Dore, 2008). At the same time, 
institutional shortfalls may make agency issues much more visible (La Porta et al., 2000a). In 
many EMs, the legal system is less predictable and/or effective and the market for corporate 
control less developed, with family owned and controlled firms the dominant ownership form 
(Amsden & Hikino, 1994; Claessens et al., 1999; Guillén, 2000; Demirbag & Yaprak, 2015). 
Boards of directors that contain family members, rather than independent members, may have 
a greater effect on the firm’s strategic decisions (Demirbag et al., 1995; Selekler-Goksen & 
Yıldırım-Oktem, 2009). In the absence of other external mechanisms to protect minority 
shareholders (Kula & Tatoglu, 2006), owner families have viewed the board of directors 
simply as a vehicle to maintain control over their firms (Selekler-Goksen & Yıldırım-Oktem, 
2009). As Gaur et al. (2014) note, firms rely on networks to overcome the consequences of 
institutional voids, in other words, relying on informal ties to get things done when formal 
modes of regulation are unsupportive or capricious. Internal corporate governance represents 
not only a mechanism for building on systemic strengths but also for compensating for 
weaknesses (Singh et al., 2013; Lane & Wood, 2012). This may make family ownership a 
relatively efficient mode of control (Fainschmidt et al., 2016), irrespective of the problems it 
might open up for minority investors.  
A burgeoning body of literature deploys institutional theory to understand the strategic 
choices of EM MNEs (Peng, 2003; Wright et al., 2005; Demirbag et al., 2010a; Surdu & 
Mellahi, 2016; Peng et al., 2008; Wood & Demirbag, 2012). North (1990, p. 3) states that 
institutions are normally described as the “rules of the game in a society” which consist of 
formal rules and informal constraints. Institutional theory suggests that the success and 
survival of an MNE hinges on its compliance with the rules and belief systems prevailing in 
business environments (Deephouse, 1996; Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Dacin et al., 2007). The 
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decisions of MNEs may be influenced in very diverse ways by the institutional distance 
between home and host countries (Campbell et al., 2012). 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
relevant literature and sets out the study’s hypotheses. We then present the research methods, 
followed by data analysis and results. The final section contains a discussion and conclusions. 
 
2.  Context, theory and hypotheses 
2.1. MNEs in context 
What firms do, depends on both the formal and informal regulations specific to the 
context in which they operate (Brewster et al., 2008). As MNEs straddle national institutional 
domains, they are only partially rooted in each of the countries in which they operate (Morgan 
& Kristensen, 2006). Hence, we argue that MNEs will be more sensitive to internal corporate 
governance mechanisms than their domestic counterparts will, and hence, they form the 
primary focus of this study.  
 
2.2. Board composition: Varieties of director 
In considering the composition of boards, a key distinction is between “outside” 
directors and “inside” ones (Johnson et al., 1996, p. 417). The latter represent board members 
who are employees of the firm (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Peng, 2004). Some scholars 
claim that inside directors tend to exhibit risk aversion behavior in entry strategy selection 
(Judge, 2012) because they face losing their jobs in the event of an unsuccessful strategy. This 
discourages the firm from adopting internationalization strategies at all and may hamper the 
extent of the firm’s internationalization (Filatotchev et al., 2001).  
From an agency perspective, inside directors who want to protect their relationship with 
the firm cannot objectively monitor the family members’ activities (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). 
To maintain their position in the firm, they will choose to take sides with the founding family 
members who control the firm. Agency approaches further suggest that the desire of family 
members to protect their interests results in other investors being left worse off (Morck & 
Yeung, 2003; Bugra, 2007). However, the importance of family – and the strategic extension 
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of family ties - may increase pressures to invest in or support the business interests of other 
members of the extended family (Morck & Yeung, 2003), which may focus the firm on local 
investments, rather than taking substantial stakes in foreign affiliates. Zahra (2003) argues 
that a focus on family orientated concerns will mitigate against investments abroad. Family 
firms may become conservative over time and be unwilling to enter new or unfamiliar 
environments and prefer to operate within zones family members are familiar with (Zahra, 
2005). This may entail foregoing significant business opportunities abroad. If inside directors 
lack independence from the family, then they will be likely to share their expected aversion to 
high levels of equity ownership abroad. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 1a. The ratio of inside directors (that is directors who are employed by the firm, 
but not family members), will be negatively associated with the extent of equity ownership of 
EM MNE affiliates.  
 
Independent directors are those who have no material relation with the firm except for 
board membership, this would include outside directors who have no family relationship 
(Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Peng, 2004; Usdiken & Yildirim-Oktem, 2008). Beneficial investor 
business opportunities, including internationalization, may be missed because of the above-
mentioned local bias by family members and their proxies. Hence, agency theory would hold 
that they serve a vital role in protecting the interests of minority shareholders against families 
and their managerial placemen (Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Peng, 2004; Morck & Yeung, 
2003). When independent directors dominate the board, they may dilute such pressures.  
Nonetheless, Bugra (2007, p. 286) found that independent directors lacked the ability to 
question the founding family members’ decisions. Hence, independent directors’ role on the 
board may not go much beyond enhancing the prestige of the company (Selekler-Goksen & 
Karatas, 2008). It is unlikely that family members would authorize the independent directors 
to promote the minority shareholders’ interests, which are not congruent with their own 
(Bugra, 2007). Consequently, it is not the presence of independent directors that matters, but 
whether they are actually able to genuinely have an impact. If family members are confident 
7 
 
in their ability to reign in independent directors and ensure that they promote family interests, 
then they will not so much seek to insist on a fixed number of independent directors, but 
rather will be guided by whether or not they can impose effective control on them. Indeed, a 
large number of compliant independent directors subject to influences of members of the 
owning family may amplify the latter’s concerns rather than those of other shareholders. In 
addition, such family members are likely to prefer that investment is directed towards other 
businesses in which the family has an interest, rather than new ventures abroad. Hence, in EM 
contexts, where family ownership is widespread, even among MNEs, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1b. The ratio of independent directors (that is, neither family members nor 
employed by the firm) will be negatively associated with the extent of equity ownership of EM 
MNE affiliates. 
 
In the case of family owned businesses, there is a tendency for management to be 
transferred from generation to generation. In EMs, marriage alliances (as frequently observed 
in Turkey [Bugra, 2007]) represent a mechanism for extending the influence of business 
families. Applications of agency theory to family businesses hold that a common agency 
failing arises from divergences of interests between family members and minority 
shareholders (Anderson & Reeb, 2004). Family members may be reluctant to invest abroad 
both on account of the need to provide investment capital for relatives and/or because of a 
preference for conducting business within the comfort zone afforded by family-based 
networks. If family members are well represented on boards, they may use their position to 
force the firm to concentrate investments on the home market, potentially leaving minority 
shareholders worse off. Conversely, if families are in a weaker position on boards, then other 
shareholders may be able to drive greater internationalization when opportunities emerge 
(Fernandez & Nieto, 2006).  
 
Hypothesis 1c. The ratio of family directors will be negatively associated with the extent of 
equity ownership of EM MNE affiliates. 
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2.3. Size of family stake vs. overseas equity ownership 
In family owned businesses, there may be pressures to concentrate investments 
favorable to other businesses owned by extended family members, making firms more 
reluctant to channel resources to more remote destinations (Morck & Yeung, 2003). Zahra 
(2005) argues that a tendency for family businesses to become inward looking and focused 
towards family-based networks may mitigate against a willingness to invest in unfamiliar 
contexts. Cerrato and Piva (2012) found that when family influence is diluted by outside – 
and foreign – shareholders such firms were more likely to take larger stakes abroad. Similarly, 
Sciascia et al. (2012) note that family dominated firms may be internationally entrepreneurial 
when levels of family equity ownership is moderate. The reason for this is that the ratio of the 
family’s own funds invested abroad is less and the costs (and uncertainties) are shared with 
other investors. There may be a further agency issue: family members may be under pressure 
to invest in businesses held by family members in the diaspora (Stewart, 2003), and this can 
be rendered more palatable if outsiders bear some of the costs. Hence:  
 
Hypothesis 2. The ratio of equity stake held by family directors will be negatively associated 
with the extent of equity ownership of EM MNE affiliates. 
 
2.4. The moderating impact of institutional distance on the relationship between board 
composition, family ownership and foreign equity ownership strategy  
Based on Scott’s (2001) classification of institutions, institutional distance is defined as 
the extent of dissimilarities between the institutional settings of home and host countries 
(Kostova, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Gaur & Lu, 2007). The institutional differences 
between the home and host countries significantly affect the MNE’s strategic decisions 
(Ando, 2012). Many studies report that the institutional dissimilarities between home and host 
countries impact directly, or moderate, various facets of entry mode strategies of MNEs (e.g. 
Davis et al., 2000; Yiu & Makino, 2002; Eden & Miller, 2004; Xu et al., 2004; Gaur & Lu, 
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2007; Meyer et al., 2009; Demirbag et al., 2010a; 2010b). In new and unfamiliar institutional 
environments, MNEs encounter added costs of doing business abroad and competitive 
disadvantage (Eden & Miller, 2004). The institutional distance increases external uncertainty 
as perceived by MNEs (Gaur & Lu, 2007); causes difficulty in transferring organizational 
practices, knowledge and strategic resources abroad (Kostova, 1999); intensifies the liability 
of foreignness (Ando, 2012); causes difficulty in managing the local environment (Xu & 
Shenkar, 2002); and increases transaction and coordination costs of production (Demirbag et 
al., 2007; Arslan & Larimo, 2011). Gaur and Lu (2007) classified these costs as unfamiliarity 
hazards and relational hazards.  
There is an extensive body of work evaluating the effects of institutional distance on 
entry and subsequent strategic choices of MNEs (Campbell et al., 2012; Schwens et al., 2011; 
Tihanyi et al., 2005). However, recent strands of institutional thinking suggest that the 
relationship between formal structures and action is neither direct nor deterministic (Wood & 
Lane, 2012). Specific patterns of close inter-personal and familial ties may coalesce to 
constitute an informal regulatory structure, especially when formal institutional arrangements 
are poorly coupled or fluid (Goodwin et al., 1993). Hence, Johansen and Schoar (2006) found 
that, even when controlling for institutions, family ties had a direct impact on organizational 
outcomes. Indeed, embedded family ties may provide the primary framework for decision 
making, with variations in home and host country formal institutional arrangements failing to 
even exert a moderating effect (Goodwin et al., 1993). Consequently, in this study, we 
emphasize the role of formal institutions in moderating embedded family ties and associated 
informal regulatory mechanisms. 
The superior knowledge and links of local partners can assist MNEs to overcome alien 
environments and institutional distance, thereby increasing recognition. Nevertheless, the 
problems of working with indigenous partners should not be ignored. In these environments, 
the selection of an indigenous partner is itself a challenge (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; 
Demirbag et al., 1995). A greater institutional distance between the home and host countries 
makes interacting with local agents more challenging (Ferreira et al., 2009). It becomes 
increasingly harder to find reliable local partners the more the institutional distance increases 
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(Gaur & Lu, 2007). Local partners are likely to act opportunistically, therefore, higher levels 
of coordination and monitoring is needed (Gomes-Casseres, 1990), and the distance increases 
the costs of overall governance (Demirbag & Mirza, 2000; Xu & Shenkar, 2002; Eden & 
Miller, 2004; Chao & Kumar, 2010). In this context, the relational hazard costs may exceed 
the costs stemming from unfamiliarity hazard.  
It has commonly been held that a lower level of equity ownership mitigates risk: The 
stakes are much lower should something go wrong, with risk being shared between investors 
(Folta & Ferrier, 2000). Local partners may also possess superior intelligence as to country of 
domicile dynamics, and reduce risk (Rugman, 2003). Consequently, firms may work to ensure 
greater centralization in ownership and control to mitigate risk (Hoskisson & Hitt 1988; 
Killing, 1983; Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Demirbag & Weir, 2005; Beamish & Lupton, 2009). 
This enables greater internal coherence and alleviates the risks of falling foul of a powerful 
local partner (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Hence, John et al. (2008) argue that when investor rights are 
weak or uncertain, outright control may be a preferred option. It can be argued that EM 
investors may be better equipped to understand the uncertainties and challenges of doing 
business in other similar contexts than their peers from developed economies. When they 
enter less familiar countries, they may prefer more direct and closer control, as relational costs 
escalate. Accordingly, it may be argued that institutional distance moderates the effect of the 
board composition on the equity ownership level. 
Faced with substantial dissimilarity in institutions, EM firms will attempt to overcome 
these costs and external uncertainty by raising the degree of control over foreign affiliates 
(Ando, 2012). Even if the board size is large, or there are more independent and inside 
directors, the management board will still reflect the expectations of founding family 
members and/or majority shareholders. Indeed, if outsider directors are drawn from family 
members’ networks, they may amplify them. Hence: 
 
Hypothesis 3a. Institutional distance positively moderates the relationship between the ratio 
of inside directors and the extent of equity ownership of EM MNEs in their affiliates. 
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Hypothesis 3b. Institutional distance positively moderates the relationship between the ratio 
of independent directors and the extent of equity ownership of EM MNEs in their affiliates. 
 
It is likely that family members will exhibit risk-averse preferences, given their desire to 
protect their own and their families’ interests. In turn, this would reflect an interest in 
guarding their socio-economic wealth and status. Gómez-Mejía et al. (2007) found that even 
if the resultant strategic choices made might reduce returns, families would persist with them 
if they were seen as effective in mitigating risk. Fattoum-Guedri et al. (2017) suggested that 
this risk aversion would feed into a desire to ensure a high degree of control, even if, again, 
this might be bad for returns. This does not mean that all family businesses are closed, inward 
looking or wedded to a specific locale. Indeed, Kraus et al. (2018) found that many family 
owned businesses were open minded about seeking out new opportunities, even if this went 
hand in hand with risk aversion. In looking abroad, such firms may seek to decrease relational 
hazard costs and ensure close control of affiliates in environments about which they are likely 
to know little (c.f. Bugra, 2007; Wood et al., 2014b). If there is a large representation of 
family directors on the board, and/or if the equity stake by family directors is relatively high, 
then they are more likely to be able impose a risk mitigation agenda. Hence: 
  
Hypothesis 3c. Institutional distance positively moderates the relationship between the ratio 
of family directors and the extent of equity ownership of EM MNEs in their affiliates. 
 
Hypothesis 3d. Institutional distance positively moderates the relationship between the ratio 
of equity stake held by family directors and the extent of equity ownership of EM MNEs in 
their affiliates. 
 
3. Research methods 
3.1. Context 
Our study is conducted in an EM context, and we adopt Turkey as the site of the study. 
There are several reasons for adopting Turkey as the context of this study. Turkey’s 
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institutional environment has much in common with other EMs (Cavusgil et al., 2002). For 
instance, in addition to a high degree of family ownership and the traditional family-based 
model of the firm, Turkey evinces many of the pronounced characteristics of a weak corporate 
governance regime, with poor law enforcement and protection for owner rights, recent 
reforms notwithstanding (Yurtoglu, 2003; Demirag & Serter, 2003; Ararat, 2011). Yurtoglu 
(2000) classifies Turkey as having an “insider system”. Such countries typically lack external 
mechanisms for managerial control, which means that internal controls, such as board of 
directors, become more significant for corporate governance (Mak & Li, 2001; Guillen & 
Capron, 2016). 
The primary concern confronting large business groups in many EMs, such as Turkey, 
is board professionalization (Amsden & Hikino, 1994; Guillén, 2000; Demirag & Serter, 
2003; Bugra, 2007; Yildirim-Oktem & Usdiken, 2010). Founding family board members 
often wish to maintain control over the company (Bugra, 2007) and undertake a more active 
role in the strategic decision-making of affiliated firms (Selekler-Goksen & Yildirim-Oktem, 
2009). In Turkish firms, on average more than one-third of all board members are large 
shareholders (Yurtoglu, 2000). Firms have a “one-tier board system” where managing 
executives are also represented on the board (Yurtoglu, 2000). The link between management 
boards and the internationalization process has become a strategic concern for EM-based 
firms following liberalization (Toulan, 2002). Existing evidence from Turkey suggests that 
board member features have a major influence on the internationalization performance of 
affiliates (Selekler-Goksen & Yildirim-Oktem, 2009). 
 
3.2. Sample  
The unit of analysis in this study is the affiliate. The sample consists of a total 374 
foreign affiliates of 71 publicly listed Turkish MNEs on the Istanbul Stock Exchange (BIST). 
The firms were chosen through a judgmental sampling procedure with respect to the 
following selection criteria: (1) We excluded parent firms in the banking and finance sectors 
because generally they do not adopt FDI strategies and have board compositions that differ 
from other firms. (2) We selected parent firms with at least 10 per cent ownership of affiliates, 
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as this range is consistent with the related literature (Tatoglu & Glaister, 1998; Larimo, 2003) 
and appropriate for the overall aims of this study; FDIs with less than 10 per cent foreign 
shareholdings are denoted as portfolio investments (Tatoglu & Glaister, 1998). (3) We 
selected parent firms with at least one foreign affiliate at the minority joint venture level. The 
affiliates in the sample operate in a total of 61 countries, around half of which are EMs and 
the other half are developed country markets. 
 
3.3. Measures  
The following subsections include the definitions and measurements of the variables 
used in the study. 
 
3.3.1. Dependent variable  
The level of foreign equity stake adopted by Turkish MNEs to enter foreign countries 
was treated as the dependent variable. This variable was measured by the ratio of equity stake 
held by the Turkish MNE in its affiliate based in the host country. The foreign equity 
ownership level was drawn from the Public Disclosure Platform and the firm’s yearly reports. 
 
3.3.2. Predictor variables  
With reference to previous research (e.g. Rhoades & Rechner, 2001; Filatotchev et al., 
2001, 2008; Lien et al., 2005; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Selekler-Goksen & Karatas, 2008; Lu 
et al., 2009; Yildirim-Oktem & Usdiken, 2010; Filatotchev & Wright, 2011), board 
composition was measured as the ratio of independent directors, the ratio of inside directors 
and the ratio of family members. The equity stake held by family board members was 
measured by the ratio of the equity stake held by family board members. Details of 
measurement of these variables are provided in Appendix A.  
 
3.3.3. Moderator variable 
We used the institutional distance between home and host countries as the moderator 
variable. Firstly, consistent with prior literature (e.g. Gaur et al., 2007; Arslan & Larimo, 
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2010; Chao & Kumar, 2010; Hernández & Nieto, 2015), we evaluated the institutional 
distance at regulative and normative levels. While there are several reports and databases 
published by different institutions to measure the dimensions of institutional aspects, they all 
vary in terms of the publication year, the countries analyzed, scales and constructs used. The 
data for these institutional dimensions were taken from the Global Competitiveness Report 
2015-2016 published annually by World Economic Forum (2015) (see Appendix A for 
detailed information of their measurement). It is one of the most commonly used databases in 
the literature where the various editions of this database have been utilized to measure the 
differential effects of institutional distance (e.g. Xu et al., 2004; Gaur et al., 2007; Kaynak et 
al., 2007; Chao & Kumar, 2010). Secondly, the structural validity of the regulative and 
normative institutional distances was tested by exploratory factor analysis. Principal 
component analysis with varimax rotation method was conducted for examining the factor 
structure of these variables. The results of the factor analysis reveal that all sub-dimensions of 
these institutional distance variables are loaded in one factor. This factor explained 78 per 
cent of the total variance in the data (Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy = 
0.921; Barlett’s test of sphericity = 926.662; p < 0.01). The internal consistency of this factor 
was high (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.967)1. In light of these analyses, all sub-dimensions of the 
two institutional distance variables are loaded in only one dimension. This one dimension, 
labeled ‘institutional distance’, was used in this study2.  
 
3.3.4. Control variables 
Three categories of control variables are included. Parent company level controls 
comprise board size, unrelated product diversification and international diversification. Host 
country level controls include minority shareholder protection, cultural distance, geographic 
                                                 
1The details of the results of the structural validity and internal consistency of the variables are not reported here 
because of page limitations. However, they are available on request. 
2We examine the moderating effects of regulative and normative institutional distances between a MNE’s home 
and host countries separately on the relationship between board composition, family ownership and foreign 
equity ownership level. There are no differences between the results of the one dimension as the institutional 
distance and two dimensions as regulative and normative institutional distances separately. The results of both 
institutional distances analyzed separately are available on request. 
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distance, linguistic distance, corruption distance, country risk and emerging market. Affiliate 
level controls are affiliate size and industry. 
 
Parent company level controls  
In Turkey, as in many EMs, boards of directors are expected to promote the founding 
family shareholders’ interests over those of minority shareholders. A large board does not 
mean that outsider and non-executive directors, who are assumed to protect minority 
shareholders’ rights, can effectively represent their interests (Selekler-Goksen & Yıldırım-
Oktem, 2009). Regardless of size, the ratio of outside members, independent members and 
non-executive members, whose functions are controversial in the Turkish context, may be 
modest (Usdiken & Yıldırım-Oktem, 2008). Given that different parts of an extended family 
are more likely to be represented in a larger board, and that each will have an interest in 
protecting their own commercial interests, it may be harder to forge agreement around a major 
new commitment to an overseas market. Hence, it can be expected that an increase in board 
size leads a firm to choose a low proportion of equity stake in the foreign affiliate. 
International diversification denotes the extent to which Turkish MNEs operate in 
dissimilar host markets or regions (Hitt et al., 1997). International diversification may 
increase MNEs’ risks because of augmented administrative uncertainties and complexities 
associated with operating in new host country environments (Tihanyi et al., 2005). Thus, we 
envisage Turkish MNEs to prefer equity shareholding in their affiliates in order to mitigate 
the potential risks arising from cultural and institutional dissimilarities between home and 
host country operations.  
Unrelated product diversification can be defined as the degree to which firms extend 
their businesses by developing new product markets (Hitt et al., 1997). Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g. Demirbag et al., 2009), we expect that such diversified Turkish MNEs 
are more likely to choose a lower level of equity shareholding in their affiliates. 
 
Host country level controls  
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Property rights centered approaches to corporate governance set great store by minority 
shareholder protection (La Porta et al., 2000b). It is argued that in the absence of this, a large 
shareholder(s) may collude with managers to serve their mutual interests, leaving other 
shareholders much worse off. Kim et al. (2007) conclude that strong minority shareholder 
protection leads to boards that are more independent. In other words, it is harder to sustain a 
board rigged in favor of managers and a majority shareholder.  
While the findings of prior studies on the effect of cultural distance on MNEs’ choice of 
a particular equity ownership mode in their affiliates show some mixed evidence (Brouthers 
& Brouthers, 2001), we adopt the viewpoint that when EM MNEs access foreign markets, that 
are culturally dissimilar from their home countries, they would be driven by a specific motive 
to learn how to do business in the host country market, thus encouraging them to opt for a 
lower equity shareholding in their affiliates (Demirbag et al., 2009).  
The notion of geographic distance has been indicated to be a major factor influencing 
strategic decisions of MNEs related to the control and ownership of their foreign affiliates 
(Contractor et al., 2016). Turkish MNEs confront a growing level of information asymmetry 
as geographic distance increases, which makes it highly onerous when making an equity 
ownership decision. Thus, we assume that Turkish MNEs may prefer a lower equity stake in 
their affiliates to address the problems emanating from high level of information asymmetry 
in geographically distant locations (Malhotra & Gaur, 2014).   
With the exception of a few studies (Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Demirbag et al., 2007; 
Malhotra & Gaur, 2014; Contractor et al., 2016), a linguistic distance measure has not been 
operationalized in equity ownership strategies of MNEs. Particularly for EM MNEs, a 
linguistic distance measure may complement that of cultural distance owing to the regional 
orientations of their operations (Demirbag et al., 2007). A high level of linguistic distance 
between home and host countries will affect the equity ownership decisions of Turkish MNEs 
for their affiliates by influencing managers’ attitudes towards risk. 
Country risk is defined as the uncertainty resulting from the economic, social, political 
and legal contexts of the host country (Quer et al., 2007). A greater degree of country risk will 
lead Turkish MNEs to select a lower equity stake in their affiliates. 
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In line with prior studies (e.g. Demirbag et al., 2007), we assume that as the level of 
corruption distance grows, Turkish MNEs are likely to choose a lower equity shareholding in 
their affiliates. 
It is widely acknowledged that institutional voids in host country markets exist in both 
developed countries and EMs, though the extent or threat of such voids may vary between the 
two groups. Hence, we control the nature of host country market (emerging vs. developed 
country) on ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs (Demirbag et al., 2009). 
 
Affiliate level controls 
Empirical evidence is somewhat equivocal with regard to the impact of affiliate size on 
equity ownership choice of MNEs. While some studies suggest that MNEs are more likely to 
prefer a lower equity stake in their affiliates when affiliate size is great (Gatignon & 
Anderson, 1988), others indicate that MNEs are likely to select full ownership or a higher 
equity stake in their affiliates as the size of operation increases (Zhao & Zhu, 1998; Demirbag 
et al., 2009). Given that the Turkish context still poses a great degree of risk and uncertainty, 
we assume that Turkish MNEs will select lower equity ownership in their affiliates as the 
affiliate size increases. 
To control for industry variations, the sample of affiliates was assigned into the three 
categories of manufacturing, service and tertiary industries. 
Details of measurement of these variables are provided in Appendix A. 
 
4. Data analysis and results 
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) analysis was conducted to test the 
relationships between board composition, family ownership and foreign equity ownership 
strategy (Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c and 2) and the moderating effect of institutional distance 
(Hypotheses 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d). Both the independent variables and the moderator variable 
were centered according to the procedure proposed by Aiken and West (1991). A moderator is 
“a qualitative or quantitative variable that affects the direction and strength of the relationship 
between a dependent and an independent variable” (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174). To test 
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the sensitivity of the results, we also utilized the Tobit regression procedure, as this technique 
has been widely used in prior research concerning equity ownership decisions of MNEs in 
their affiliates, when the dependent variable is censored or truncated (Delios & Beamish, 
1999a; Chadee & Qiu, 2001; Pan, 2002; Meyer et al., 2014)3. Table 1 displays the descriptive 
statistics and the correlation coefficients between the dependent, independent and moderator 
variables. 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 here 
------------------------------- 
The pairwise correlations do not indicate severe collinearity problems for the regression 
analyses, being in the acceptable range (well below 0.80) (Gujarati, 1995; Kennedy, 1999). 
The variance inflation factors (VIFs) of all variables are far below the acceptable threshold 
point (equal to or below 10) (Freund et al., 2006). Thus, multicollinearity in models is not a 
serious concern in this study. There exist, however, high correlations between several control 
variables and institutional distances, which may produce multicollinearity problems. 
Consequently, we do not include the control variables of corruption distance, country risk and 
emerging market in the models containing the moderating variable.  
 
4.1. Main effects of board composition and family ownership 
Using both OLS and Tobit regression procedures, Table 2 shows the models containing 
the direct effects of board composition (Model 1 through Model 5) and the interaction effects 
of institutional distance and board composition (Model 6 through Model 9) on the foreign 
equity ownership strategy of Turkish MNEs. The results are strongly consistent across OLS 
and Tobit specifications. Model 4 shows the full model including all independent and control 
variables. Apart from the ratio of family members and the ratio of the equity stake held by 
family board members, the other board composition variables have significant coefficients on 
the equity ownership choice of their affiliates.  
                                                 
3Although Tobit analysis is more suitable when the dependent variable is censored or truncated, in our sample 
there are only three FDIs with less than 10 per cent foreign shareholdings. Hence, OLS regression is far from 
yielding coefficient estimators that are biased. The results of the two estimating methodologies are found to be in 
close conformity in terms of the pattern of parameter significance.  
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H1a posits that the ratio of inside directors is negatively linked to the level of foreign 
equity ownership of MNEs. The coefficient on the ratio of inside directors is marginally 
significant and positive in Models 2 to 5 (p < 0.05), but not significant in Model 1, hence, no 
support is found for H1a. This implies that the higher the number of manager-directors, the 
more likely that there will be a higher level of equity ownership of affiliates. This could 
reflect the extent to which managers may seek to dilute family influence, through exposing 
the firm to different and potentially stronger institutional pressures. As the literature on 
institutions and the firm alerts us, the stronger and more developed formal institutions are, the 
harder it is to sustain the traditional model of the family dominated firm (Church, 1993). 
The ratio of independent directors displays negative and significant coefficients in 
Model 1 (p < 0.01) and Model 2 (p < 0.05). These findings confirm H1b suggesting that the 
higher the ratio of independent directors the lower the level of equity stake held by MNEs. In 
other words, nominally independent directors have the effect of amplifying, rather than 
diluting the effects of family ownership. 
According to Model 1 through Model 5, there is no support for either H1c or H2. The 
coefficients of the ratio of family members and the ratio of the equity stake held by family 
board members are not significant in all four models. This could reflect the ability of families 
to impose their influence by other means, for example, through the operation of informal 
family-based networks. 
Table 2 shows that the coefficient of institutional distance is insignificant in Model 5 
showing the main effects. This implies that the differences in institutional environment 
between the home and host countries do not have any direct effect on the ratio of equity stake 
held by MNEs. 
As shown in Table 2, when the control variables are included (Models 2 to 5), two of 
the parent level controls, board size and unrelated product diversification have negative and 
significant coefficients. This confirms that MNEs that have a larger board size (p < 0.05) and 
characterized by high level of unrelated product diversification (p < 0.01) prefer a lower 
equity mode. Only one of the three affiliate level controls, affiliate size has a negative and 
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significant coefficient (p < 0.05) in Models 3 to 5. None of the host country related variables 
are statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 4.2. Moderating impact of institutional distance  
The results of the moderating effect of institutional distance on the linkage between the 
corporate governance mechanism of board composition and equity ownership strategies of 
MNEs are shown in Model 6 to Model 9 of Table 2. If the interaction term is significant, this 
signifies that the effect of the board composition on the level of equity shareholding held by 
MNEs in their affiliates is identified somewhat by the institutional distance between home and 
host countries (Zeitner, 1998). In such circumstances, institutional distance significantly 
moderates the relationship between the board composition and equity-based ownership 
strategy.  
In Table 2, there are four models (Models 6 through Model 9) that examine interactions 
between the institutional distance and board composition. Both F statistics and LR χ2 in all 
four regression equations are significant (p < 0.01) and hence are useful for explanation 
purposes. It should be noted that there is not substantial augmentation of adjusted R2 values in 
the models where the moderators are added. This is not surprising in empirical studies of this 
nature, when there are several common variables (board composition and control variables) 
used together (Agresti & Franklin, 2013; McClean et al., 2013). As shown in Models 6 to 9 of 
Table 2, the interaction effects between institutional distance and the board composition 
variables of the ratios of independent directors, family members and the equity stake held by 
family board members are positive and statistically significant (p < 0.05, p < 0.05, p < 0.01, 
respectively) providing support for H3b, H3c and H3d, respectively. The negative interaction 
effect between institutional distance and the ratio of inside directors is also statistically 
significant (p < 0.05) but contrary to our expectation in H3a, which is accordingly rejected. 
These results show that institutional distance positively moderates overall the relationship 
between board composition (except the ratio of inside directors) and MNEs’ equity ownership 
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in their affiliates. However, the interactions between all the board composition variables and 
institutional distance reverse the signs of their main effects. We sought to clarify these effects 
further by comparing high and low institutional distance levels by plotting graphs (Figures 2A 
to 2D). These effects are interpreted in line with Aiken and West (1991). 
The simple slope analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen et al., 2003), as shown in Figure 
2A, indicates the effect of interaction between the ratio of inside directors and institutional 
distance on the extent of MNEs’ equity stake in their affiliates. The ratio of inside directors 
has a positive effect on equity ownership at a low level of institutional distance (β = 34.232, p 
< 0.01), while it has no significant effect on equity ownership at a high level of institutional 
distance, which is contrary to our expectation in H3a. This means that when institutional 
distance is low, the greater the ratio of inside directors, the higher the level of the equity stake 
held by MNEs in their affiliates.  
Figure 2B shows the interaction effect between the ratio of independent directors and 
institutional distance. As shown in Figure 2B, the ratio of independent directors has a negative 
effect on the equity ownership level of MNEs in their affiliates when institutional distance is 
at a low level (β = -47.572; p < 0.01) while it has no significant impact on equity ownership 
when institutional distance is at a high level. That is, when institutional distance is low, the 
greater the level of the ratio of independent directors the lower the level of equity stake held 
by MNEs in their affiliates. This finding supports H3b, suggesting that when institutional 
distance is low, the relationship between the ratio of independent directors and the level of 
equity shareholding of MNEs in their affiliates is negative. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2A and 2B here 
---------------------------------------- 
Figure 2C shows the interaction between the ratio of family directors and institutional 
distance. This plot indicates a positive relationship between the ratio of family directors and 
equity ownership level when institutional distance is high (β = 7.576, p < 0.05) and a negative 
relationship when institutional distance is low (β = -20.542, p < 0.05). This means that where 
institutional distance is high, the greater the ratio of family directors on the board the greater 
the MNE’s equity ownership in its affiliates. When institutional distance is low, the greater 
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the ratio of family directors then the lower the foreign equity ownership level. This finding 
confirms our expectations for H3c, in that the link between the ratio of family directors and 
the extent of equity stake held by MNEs in their affiliates is positive when institutional 
distance is high. 
In a similar vein, Figure 2D displays the plot of the interaction between the ratio of the 
equity stake held by family board directors and institutional distance on MNEs’ equity 
ownership level in their affiliates. Simple slope analyses reveal that the proportion of the 
equity stake held by family board directors has a positive effect on the equity ownership when 
institutional distance is high (β = 0.703, p < 0.01), while there is not a significant effect on the 
ownership equity level when institutional distance is low. At a high level of institutional 
distance, the higher the proportion of the equity stake held by family board directors, the more 
likely that MNEs choose a high level of equity ownership in their affiliates. This finding 
supports H3d, that when institutional distance is large, the link between the ratio of the equity 
stake held by family board directors and the level of MNEs’ equity stake in their affiliates is 
positive. 
---------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 2C and 2D here 
---------------------------------------- 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
This study examines how the corporate governance mechanism of board composition 
and institutional distance impacts the foreign equity ownership strategies of MNEs, according 
particular attention to the consequences of family ownership. Recent work by Ilhan-Nas et al. 
(2018), focused exclusively on the effects of ownership concentration and institutional 
distance on the equity-based ownership strategies of Turkish MNEs. This study adds to the 
literature by examining both the direct effects of board composition and the interaction effects 
of board composition and institutional distance on foreign equity ownership strategies. 
Specifically, there is a much more finely grained focus on institutional effects, deploying 
recent advances in the literature on comparative capitalism. Furthermore, the study sheds light 
on the interplay between internal and external corporate governance. The findings highlight 
the limits of agency theory as a universally applicable explanatory tool, especially in the 
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context of EMs. From a broad historical and institutional perspective, there is a body of 
literature, which, whilst acknowledging that a number of Western family businesses retain the 
traditional characteristics of such firms, there are many that no longer do so (Jones & Rose, 
1993). For example, Church (1993) argues that in the developed world, family ownership 
matters much less than institutional setting and internal corporate culture. Boltanski and 
Chiapallo (2000) argue that the disorganized and arbitrary nature of the traditional family 
enterprise has been supplanted through modern managerial methods and systems. In contrast, 
in the developing world, it has been argued that the family firm retains its traditional 
characteristics, which prioritize patriarchal control, and a focus on family decision-making 
rather than objective systems. Indeed, as part and parcel of neo-liberal reforms, privatizations 
have enabled influential families to acquire significant new assets. In Turkey, this is similarly 
the case (Gökarıksel & Secor, 2009), albeit that there has been a consolidation of wealth in 
the hands of a few such families with strong ties to the political elite and the military. Recent 
political developments have resulted in a certain dynamism to the system, with some families 
that were in official favor in the past now being less so, and vice versa. In practical terms, this 
implies that formal corporate governance mechanisms matter less than the informal solutions 
derived by families to solve particular corporate problems. This study confirms that whilst 
specific internal corporate governance structures matter, of equal or greater importance is the 
role of dominant families and the patterns of strategies they adopt to secure their interests.   
A primary finding is that increasing the ratio of independent directors on the board leads 
to a reduced willingness to take larger stakes in overseas affiliates. This is not consistent with 
the predictions of agency theory, but it is consistent with our expectations. In Turkey, family 
dynamics and self-control problems combine and undermine the effectiveness of independent 
directors (Schulze et al., 2001) because they almost never acquire the status of large-block 
ownership. Independent directors accordingly behave like family members in favoring 
investments at home, given that they are appointed to directorship positions by owning 
families. Independent directors are included on the board in order to comply with external 
institutional pressures rather than to secure better internal corporate governance (Usdiken & 
Yildirim-Oktem, 2008). As Zattoni and Cuomo (2010) note, the incentives provided to, and 
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competencies of, independent directors have often been neglected as a governance issue. Yet, 
particularly in EMs, where the pool of suitably qualified individuals may be small, and the 
role of personal networks more extensive, relative independence may vary. Being an 
independent director may be accorded more prestige in society and the financial incentives 
provided may be proportionately much more attractive. This suggests that individuals will be 
more likely to become non-executive directors for the wrong reasons, less out of a sense of 
calling, and more because of the rents that accrue from the position. Hence, even if internal 
corporate governance matters much more in contexts where external corporate governance 
supports are weak, they may be much more difficult to secure (Klapper & Love, 2004). 
Consequently, independent directors may amplify, rather than dilute the effects of family 
ownership. 
When we include the moderating impact of institutional distance, as expected, the 
greater the number of (nominally) independent (but quite probably family aligned) directors 
the more MNEs select a lesser equity ownership level in their affiliates at low institutional 
distance between home and host countries. This reflects the extent to which the desire to 
concentrate investment towards family-based businesses at home may be outweighed by the 
desire to closely scrutinize investments in unfamiliar environments. Such investments may be 
prompted by other factors, for example, wealthy families from politically uncertain 
environments may seek to invest significant amounts of their own funds in perceived safe 
havens in the developed world, and those with low tax regimes. In such instances, the 
immediate business case for such investment may be outweighed by the desire to hedge risk 
in the long term. Many countries, from the UK to Malta, grant preferential immigration status 
to those individuals (and their immediate families) who invest large amounts in them. If some 
investments perform better than others, access to a safe haven may be seen as priceless. 
With respect to inside directors, a greater presence of insiders on the board is similarly 
positively linked to the extent of equity stake held by MNEs in their affiliates. In contexts 
where family ownership is relatively high, insiders may choose to take sides with the 
founding family members, in order to be able to maintain their position in the firm. Therefore, 
insiders prefer less risky entry strategies. However, and contrary to other evidence from EMs 
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(Kaymak & Bektas, 2008; Lu et al., 2009), the findings suggest that the presence of 
professional managers encourages the taking of majority stakes. This may be to dilute family 
power. The traditional model of the family firm is most easily sustained in the absence of 
fully developed institutions with advanced complementarities, and hence, it may make it 
easier for professional managers to secure their agendas and/or take the interests of other 
investors into account (Church, 1993; Wood & Lane, 2012). 
This positive effect of insiders is observed when the moderated effect of institutional 
distance is added to the model. EM MNEs, in particular, confront environmental conditions, 
which are unfamiliar when operating in foreign markets (Yamak & Usdiken, 2006). 
Consequently, salaried managers may be better equipped to understand and implement 
sophisticated methods and structures as they have established skills and technical abilities. 
Furthermore, owner-families may lack the technical expertise and management abilities of 
their salaried managers, which might assist in the implementation of more sophisticated 
organizational and management systems. In this instance, insiders and managers may act as 
good stewards in managing company assets, and so stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990) 
rather than agency theory is supported.  
This study is conducted on data from an EM, so we cannot reach conclusions as to the 
wider applicability of agency theory. However, in the Turkish context, family owners will 
seek to enforce their rights through internal corporate governance mechanisms and informal 
ties, rather than reliance on the law. Does this leave minority shareholders worse off? 
Whatever its imperfections, the traditional family firm model represents an effective and long-
standing solution for coping with limitations in regulation and in capital market development 
(Fainschmidt et al., 2016). The dominance of this model in Turkey suggests that it provides an 
effective way of coping with challenging circumstances. From a minority investor 
perspective, whilst investing in a family owned business might be problematic, it provides the 
opportunity to share the gains presented through the leveraging of extended family networks 
and patronage when formal institutional arrangements are uneven in their coverage and 
effectiveness. In other words, it may represent a relatively efficient device for maximizing 
returns in EM institutional settings, whatever the hypothetical agency problems that might 
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emerge. Hence, whilst agency theory may afford insights into the challenges in protecting 
minority investors in family-controlled firms, it has neglected the extent to which the family 
firm represents one of the most effective devices for securing returns when formal institutions 
are weak (c.f. Fainschmidt et al., 2016). Uneven or poor institutional arrangements lead to a 
lack of protection of minority investors in any case (La Porta et al., 2000a). However, the 
creative responses of the latter in building ties with systemically influential players may result 
in better outcomes for them than might at first seem. Although complementarity – that is, the 
generation of better outcomes than a scrutiny of formal institutions might suggest – is often 
seen as simply the sum of systemic strengths, in reality it often represents the outcome of 
attempts to overcome systemic weaknesses (Lane & Wood, 2012). In summary, the 
application of agency theory to EMs may be unduly pessimistic as to the relative efficiency of 
the family firm, and the possibilities for minority investors to optimize their returns.  
This does not mean that the interests of families, minority investors, or professional 
managers, are perfectly aligned. Indeed, as the findings indicate, professional managers may 
have a shared interest with minority investors in the introduction of modern managerial 
systems and a more open attitude towards extending geographical scope. In turn, this could 
weaken the hold of extensive, but informal and geographically confined, family-based 
mechanisms of control. However, such measures may be to the long-term benefit of family 
members, even if unpalatable in the short term. 
A further noteworthy finding is that there are no main effects with regard to the ratio of 
family directors and equity stake held by board members on entry strategies of MNEs. The 
reason for this insignificant effect may be that the average family member (n = 1.85) and 
equity stake held by board members (10.53%) is relatively low because of the pyramid 
ownership structure prevalent in Turkey (Yurtoglu, 2003; Demirag & Serter, 2003; Bugra, 
2007). 
Although in many areas of social and economic life, institutions serve an important role 
in shaping the choices made by firms, in this study, we found that even in a moderating role, 
institutional distance did not impose much variation in the approaches adopted by family 
board members (Johansen & Schoar, 2006; Goodwin et al., 1993), who, regardless of 
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circumstances, remained more risk averse than non-family members. We found that the 
determinants of equity ownership levels in overseas affiliates was primarily a function of 
board composition and family ownership albeit that institutional effects either moderated or 
intensified this relationship, rather than exerting direct effects. Prior research would suggest 
that the ratio of equity stake held by board members has a significant impact on the equity 
ownership level in affiliates (Demsetz & Villagonga, 2001; Booth et al., 2002), however, no 
strong support for this was found in this study. When the moderating impact of the 
institutional distance is considered, the ratio of equity stake held by board members is 
positively related to the level of equity stake held by MNEs in their affiliates at high 
institutional distance. This may reflect a desire to exert closer control in unfamiliar settings. A 
smaller equity stake held by board members at low institutional distance may reflect greater 
confidence that their interests will be protected. At low institutional distance, the board 
composition variable of the equity stake held by board members behaves like family board 
members. However, the interesting finding is that the ratio of equity stake held by board 
members is positively linked to the MNEs’ equity ownership level in their affiliates, being 
more in favor of a majority ownership if the host country is a developed country. This could 
reflect the desire for closer control – and monitoring – of investments in unfamiliar 
environments. It could also reflect the extent to which families and other holders of equity 
may use their overseas investments to buy themselves a safe haven abroad, placing their 
assets in an institutionally more stable environment, and potentially securing for themselves 
and their relatives a preferential migration status. In contrast, managers without a significant 
equity stake would not be able to do this. This would reflect less agency or stewardship 
issues, but rather illustrate how diversity in institutional regimes may be exploited, not just to 
optimize the utilization of capital, but also as a way of coping with uncertainty.    
The findings clearly illustrate that the key antecedent of MNEs’ equity shareholding in 
their affiliates is not the direct effect of institutional distance. Rather, institutional distance has 
a moderating impact on the link between the corporate governance mechanism and equity 
ownership strategies. In confirming that institutional distance does not exert a direct effect on 
relative equity ownership, this study provides evidence that in contexts of institutional fluidity 
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and uncertainty, informal relationships and ways of doing things may trump formal regulatory 
effects. If what sets the traditional family firm apart is that patrimonial power is mediated by 
informal understandings, then internal corporate governance mechanisms and informal 
conventions may matter much more than external ones. In contexts where formal rules matter 
more – that is, in the most developed economies – then Turkish MNEs seem much more 
reluctant to commit significant amounts of their capital into a single enterprise. In developed 
economy settings, family investors are better able to enforce their ownership rights through 
conventional external legal mechanisms, as opposed to internal solutions. 
The results relating to the control variables indicate that board size, unrelated product 
diversification and affiliate size are important antecedents of equity-based ownership 
strategies of MNEs. In other words, MNEs prefer the less risky equity ownership modes as 
the board size, the level of unrelated product diversification and affiliate size increase.  
 
5.1. Implications 
The study highlights the complex and mixed agendas different types of owners and 
managers may impose on the firm. Rather than seeing either grouping as internally coherent 
and sharing the same agenda, each is internally diverse. In contexts where the traditional 
family firm model dominates, family owners rather than relying on the external corporate 
governance regime, will resort to formal and informal internal governance mechanisms for 
imposing their agendas, in line with embedded norms of practice. What concerns predominate 
will, in turn, be closely bound up with the wider context, and the nature and efficacy of 
overall institutional configurations. This suggests that there is no optimal internal governance 
structure for EM MNEs, but those seeking to reform internal corporate governance need to 
take due heed of what has proven to be broadly functional and viable within a specific 
context, and to consider fully the implications for overseas affiliates, for example, the dilution 
of family influence may lead to a greater appetite for risk with uncertain consequences. 
The existing literature on family capitalism holds that this is a relatively efficient device 
for managing the challenges posed by incomplete and fluid institutions. Extended family-
based networks may impart a greater predictability to exchange relations than a scrutiny of 
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formal regulatory efficiency might suggest (c.f. Fainschmidt et al., 2016). They may also 
provide a basis for coopting local and national power holders. Whilst family-controlled firms 
may be associated with specific agency problems, minority investors may nonetheless persist 
with them owing to the advantages that they provide. Existing syntheses between institutional 
theory and agency theory have tended to focus on formal dimensions of the former (Gaur et 
al., 2014; La Porta et al., 2000a). However, as the literature on comparative institutional 
analysis alerts us (Lane & Wood, 2012), institutions encompass not only formal regulations, 
but embedded informal rules and understandings, such as that might underpin shared 
conventions of fair play in the operation of family networks, and informal understandings and 
accommodations between different categories of investor and other players. This study 
confirms the importance of the latter and provides insights into the bounded range of outward 
investment strategies of firms under family capitalism.    
For policy makers, the findings suggest that reforms targeting corporate governance 
practices in general and the formation of management boards in particular, should take into 
account the role of board composition. For instance, focusing on reforming the functioning of 
boards by applying simple guidelines, such as limits on the composition of board membership 
(e.g. ratio of females, insiders and outsiders) and restrictions on the size of the board may be 
counterproductive or ineffectual, depending on the relative power of existing stakeholders and 
the strength of their ties with others. For example, there may be a need to recognize and 
accommodate the dominance of family ownership, and seek to promote mechanisms by which 
the interests of such families may be reconciled with the needs of other owners and 
stakeholders, in seeking to develop optimal strategies for investing abroad. 
 
5.2. Limitations and future research 
Notwithstanding the study’s contributions, as is usual, this study has limitations that 
should be acknowledged when interpreting the results, but also provides avenues for further 
research. First, the study is confined to a sample of Turkish MNEs. Comparative work 
contrasting MNEs from emerging and developed markets may shed additional light on the 
different ways in which family ownership, board composition and institutions interact, and, 
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further, on when (i.e. which stage of institutional development) the traditional family firm 
model (as adverse to family ownership per se) becomes less sustainable. Another limitation is 
that the study only considers board composition and family ownership, so the nature of our 
data prevents us from investigating the performance implications of such choice. Moreover, 
due to data limitations, we were not able to control for the strategic motivations for equity 
ownership choice. Further, the relative representation of extended family interests versus 
willingness to venture abroad at all, and the impact of diasporas on the size of ownership 
stakes in overseas affiliates represents a fruitful area for future research. Finally, there is room 
for the development and extension of institutional theory to explore in more depth the effects 
of widespread family ownership, and to locate the choices of key actors within broader 
structural continuity and change, and vice versa. There are two dimensions to this. A shortfall 
of the literature on comparative institutional analysis is a tendency to focus on the relationship 
between formal institutions and macro-economic outcomes, with the firm as something of a 
transmission belt between the two (Wood et al., 2014a). This study provides insights into the 
relationship between wider contextual realities, internal corporate governance arrangements 
and outward investment decisions. The findings suggest that a closer focus on patterns and 
modes of internal corporate governance might enrich the basis under which different types of 
capitalism might be compared. This is especially the case given the growing interest in the 
family capitalism archetype (Fainschmidt et al., 2016). The second is that whilst there have 
been increasing syntheses between institutional and agency approaches, there has been a 
tendency to view EM institutions in terms of their negative consequences (c.f. La Porta et al., 
2000a). However, whatever their shortfalls, creative actors may still optimize their outcomes 
than a scrutiny of formal institutional arrangements might suggest: Actors may reach informal 
compromises to mitigate the negative effects of weak minority investor protections. A closer 
evaluation of the latter would represent a fertile avenue for future research.   
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Appendix A. Variable measurement 
Variable Measurement Source Related measurement previously used 
Dependent variable: Foreign equity ownership  The proportion of equity shareholding of Turkish MNE on its affiliate 
operating in host country. 
Public Disclosure Platform (http://www.kap.gov.tr) 
and the firms' annual reports  
--- 
Predictor variables: 
The ratio of independent directors 
 
The ratio of inside directors 
The ratio of family directors 
The equity stake held by family directors 
 
The number of independent directors divided by the total number of board 
directors 
The number of inside directors divided by the total number of board directors 
The number of family directors divided by the total number of board directors 
The proportion of the equity stake held by family directors 
 
MNEs’ Corporate Governance Principles Compliance 
Reports (CGPC) 
Firms’ annual reports and audited financial tables 
Audit financial tables 
 
Rhoades and Rechner (2001); Filatotchev et al. 
(2001, 2008), Lien et al. (2005); Kaymak and Bektas 
(2008); Selekler-Goksen and Karatas (2008); Lu et 
al. (2009); Yildirim-Oktem and Usdiken (2010); 
Filatotchev and Wright (2011); Demsetz and 
Villagonga (2001). 
Moderator variable: Institutional distance  
(Regulative distance and normative distance) 
The institutional distance (by using eleven sub-items mentioned in regulative 
and normative distance below) were computed using the following procedure 
by Kogut and Singh (1988):  
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where “Ii, host (Ii, origin) is the ith dimension (total 11 dimensions) of the 
index for the host country (country of origin- Turkey) and Vi is the variance 
of ith dimension” Standardized values for each sub-index were used since 
scales are not the same across dimensions. 
Regulative distance: six items (property rights, intellectual property rights 
protection, judicial independence, burden of government regulation, 
efficiency of legal framework and transparency of government policymaking) 
were used for measuring regulative score. 
Normative distance; five items (ethical behavior of firms, strength of auditing 
and reporting standards, efficacy of corporate boards, quality of management 
schools) were used for computing normative scores. 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016 
(WEF, 2015) published annually by World Economic 
Forum (WEF) 
 
Xu et al. (2004); Ionascu et al. (2004); Demirbag et 
al. (2007); Kaynak et al. (2007); Arslan and Larimo 
(2010). Chao and Kumar (2010); Ilhan-Nas (2012). 
 
Control variables:    
Parent company level controls    
Board size The total number of directors on the board MNEs’ CGPC reports and firms’ annual reports Lien et al. (2005); Kaymak and Bektas (2008) 
International diversification 
 
This variable was formulated as: 
 	
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where affiliate (i) is the MNE’s total number of foreign affiliates, affiliate 
(max) is maximum number of foreign subsidiaries in all sample, country (i) 
is the numbers of countries in which the MNE invest, country (max) is the 
maximum number of FDI countries in all sample. 
Public Disclosure Platform (http://www.kap.gov.tr) 
and the firms' annual reports. 
 
Delios and Beamish (1999b); Lu and Beamish 
(2004); David et al. (2010). 
 
Unrelated product diversification 
 
This variable was formulated as:  
 =  ln 1/
"
#$%
 
where is the share of the jth group sales in the total sales of the firm and 
DU is unrelated diversification” (Palepu, 1985:252-253). 
Public Disclosure Platform (http://www.kap.gov.tr), 
firm’ financial statements, and SIC code: 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sicsearch.html 
 
Palepu (1985); Hitt et al. (1997); Delios and 
Beamish (1999b); Carpenter and Fredrickson 
(2001); Hillman et al. (2007); Bouquet et al. (2009); 
David et al. (2010). 
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Appendix A. (Continued) 
Variable Measurement Source Related measurement previously used 
Affiliate level controls    
The size of the affiliate 
 
The contributed capital of the affiliate in Turkish Lira. 
 
Annual reports, auditing financial statements and general 
information, and notifications released in PDP. 
Luo (2004); Kaynak et al. (2007); Demirbag et al. 
(2009). 
Industry The subsidiaries were classified into following industries which include, 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining, construction, manufacturing, 
transportation, communication, electric, gas and sanitary services, wholesale and 
retail trade, finance, insurance and real estate and services. Then, three broad 
industry categories were created: manufacturing, service and tertiary industries. 
SIC Divisions (www.osha.gov) Demirbag et al. (2007); Demirbag et al. (2008); 
Demirbag et al. (2009); Ilhan-Nas (2012). 
Host country level controls    
Protection of minority shareholder rights 
 
The protection of minority shareholder rights is computed by the sum of the scores 
for each of the ten legal provisions (powers of the general meeting for de facto 
changes, agenda-setting power, anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated, 
prohibition of multiple voting rights, independent board members, feasibility of 
directors’ dismissal, private enforcement of directors’ duties, shareholder action 
against resolutions of the general meeting, mandatory bid, disclosure of major share 
ownership), and it ranges from 0 to 10. 
Guillén – Capron Shareholder Protections Index 
https://whartonmgmt.wufoo.com/forms/guillencapron-
shareholder-protections-index/ 
 
Lele and Siems (2007); Siems (2008); Guillén and 
Capron (2016). 
 
Cultural distance 
 
Using Hofstede’s (1980) four cultural dimensions, the cultural distance was 
measured was measured based on the following formula (Kogut and Singh, 1988):  
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where “Ii host (Ii origin) is the ith dimension (Power distance, individualism, 
masculinity and uncertainty avoidance) of the index for the host country (country of 
origin-Turkey) and Vi is the variance of ith dimension. 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions published by Hofstede 
Insights https://www.hofstede-insights.com/country-
comparison/ 
 
Berry et al. (2010); Makino and Tsang (2011); 
Dellestrand and Kappen (2012); Campbell and Eden 
(2012). 
 
Geographic distance 
 
Geographic distance as the actual distance in kilometers between capital cities of 
the home and host countries. 
http://www.harita.gen.tr/mesafe-hesaplama/ Wolf and Weinschrott (1973); Hamilton and Winters 
(1992); Fratianni and Oh (2009); Slangen and 
Beugelsdijk (2010); Malhotra and Gaur (2014); 
Contractor et al. (2016). 
Linguistic distance This study follows the same path in operationalizing the linguistic distance by 
adopting the dendrogram developed by Chen et al. (1995). They constructed this 
dendrogram by using the UPMGA method based on unequal branch length 
linguistic distances. The dendrogram’s tree includes 130 localities around the world, 
which covers all languages used by investors in the database used for this study. 
Chen et al. (1995) Chen et al. (1995); Demirbag et al. (2009) 
Corruption distance 
 
This distance was measured through the following procedure developed by (Kogut 
and Singh, 1988): 
∑
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where “Ii, host (Ii, origin) is the ith dimension of the index for the host country (country 
of origin- Turkey) and Vi is the variance of ith dimension”. Standardized values for 
each sub-index were used since scales are not the same across dimensions. 
Transparency International’s Corruption Perception 
Index (CPI) scores (http://www. 
transparency.org/policy_research/ 
surveys_indices/cpi/2009 /cpi_2009_table) 
 
Habib and Zurawicki (2001); Habib and Zurawicki 
(2002); Voyer and Beamish (2004); Demirbag et al. 
(2007). 
 
Country risk The country risk scores of the PRS group are based on a composite risk rating: 
CPFER (country X) = 0.5 (PR + FR + ER) where CPFER is the composite 
political, financial and economic risk ratings, PR is the total political risk indicators, 
FR is total financial risk indicators, ER is total economic risk indicators. 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) published by 
The Political Risk Services (PRS) Group  
Oetzel et al. (2001); Kolstad and Vilanger (2008). 
Emerging market The value of 0 denotes if the host country is an emerging market or 0 otherwise. IMF country classification Demirbag et al. (2007) 
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 Figure 2A. Interaction between the proportion of inside directors and institutional distance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2B. Interaction between the proportion of independent directors and institutional distance              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2C. Interaction between the proportion of family members and institutional distance  
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2D. Interaction between the proportion of equity stake held by family members and institutional distance  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
*p < 0.01. 
 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1. Foreign equity ownership 78.33 27.64 1                   
2. Board size 8.71 2.41 -.37* 1                  
3. Ratio of inside directors 0.15 0.16 .11 -.18* 1                 
4. Ratio of independent directors 0.11 0.14 -.18* .15 -.03 1                
5. Ratio of family directors 0.21 0.20 -.07 .32* -.05 -.05 1               
6. Ratio of equity stake held by     
    family directors 
10.53 12.76 -.05 .28* .09 .31* .49* 1              
7. International diversification 0.44 0.35 -.30* .72* -.28* .06 .29* .14 1             
8. Unrelated product diversification 0.32 0.47 -.38* .51* .13 .32* .10 .35* .39* 1            
9. Affiliate size (million) 40.99 120.81 -.09 -.03 -.05 .08 .00 -.09 -.05 -.09 1           
10. Manufacturing industry 0.32 0.47 .10 -.26* .12 .09 -.31* -.12 -.23* -.17* .00 1          
11. Tertiary industry 0.36 0.48 -.09 .12* -.05 .10 .09 .14* .02 .15 .19* -.51* 1         
12. Minority shareholder protection index 6.39 1.13 .06 -.02 .03 -.12 -.05 .04 .01 -.01 -.08 .18* -.25* 1        
13. Cultural distance 1.73 0.72 .03 -.04 .10 .14 -.02 .05 -.04 .07 .08 -.26* .34* -.09 1       
14. Geographical distance (thousand) 3.56 2.20 .03 -.08 .10 .27* -.06 .06 -.08 -.02 -.02 .07 -.05 -.10 .21* 1      
15. Linguistic distance 17.19 8.36 -.03 .02 .10 .13 -.04 -.07 .07 -.01 -.04 .09 -.18* -.10 -.12 .54* 1     
16. Corruption distance 1.13 0.55 -.01 -.02 .00 .03 -.03 -.03 -.04 .01 .1 -.26* .44* -.22* .71* -.08 -.25* 1    
17. Country risk 74.24 7.07 -.08 .14 .07 .14 .06 -.02 .13 .16* .00 -.34* .32* -.30* .67* .02 .00 .68* 1   
18. Emerging market 0.41 0.49 .07 -.07 -.07 -.12 -.03 .01 -.06 -.14 -.02 .33* -.30* .24* -.74* .02 .25* -.63* -.80* 1  
19. Institutional distance 4.42 2.02 -.05 .04 .05 .14 .03 -.01 .02 .09 .06 -.34* .40* -.38* .78* .02 -.15 .86* .89* -.85* 1 
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Table 2. The results of OLS and Tobit regression models  
Variablesa 
Dependent variable: Foreign equity ownership (%) 
Main effects  Interactive effects 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5  Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT  OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT 
Independent variables                    
Ratio of inside directors 5.31 5.44 17.14* 17.43* 16.87* 17.21* 16.86* 17.25* 16.75* 17.08*  18.05* 18.39* 14.60 14.93 17.23* 17.57* 15.77 16.09 
Ratio of independent directors -31.59** -31.49** -20.68* -20.51* -17.35 -17.13 -16.61 -16.19 -16.80 -16.49  -15.14 -14.82 -21.68 -22.36 -15.66 -15.33 -15.11 -14.81 
Ratio of family directors -1.15 -1.30 -8.14 -8.40 -7.43 -7.80 -6.36 -6.69 -6.09 -6.42  -7.81 -8.16 -6.54 -6.86 -6.48 -6.82 -3.59 -3.91 
Ratio of equity stake held by family directors -0.23 -0.23 -0.38 -0.39 -0.35 -0.36 -0.31 -0.31 -0.32 -0.33  -0.34 -0.34 -0.35 -0.36 -0.35 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 
Parent company level controls                    
Board size   -3.01* -3.04* -2.91* -2.94* -2.78* -2.81* -2.77* -2.81*  -2.63* -2.67* -2.77* -2.80* -2.76* -2.79* -3.00* -3.04* 
International diversification   2.64 2.82 2.18 2.36 2.14 2.33 2.13 2.31  2.02 2.19 2.64 2.81 1.60 1.77 2.54 2.71 
Unrelated product diversification   -18.46** -18.56** -19.11** -19.23** -19.07** -19.19** -19.17** -19.30**  -19.66** -19.80** -20.15** -20.28** -19.63** -19.77** -20.95** -21.07** 
Affiliate level controls                    
Affiliate size (million)     -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02*  -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* -0.02* 
Manufacturing industry     -0.84 -0.99 -0.91 -1.12 -0.67 -0.83  -1.15 -1.32 -0.95 -1.11 -1.39 -1.56 -1.27 -1.43 
Tertiary industry     -0.25 -0.25 -0.70 -0.73 -0.44 -0.44  -0.57 -0.56 -0.53 -0.53 0.04 0.05 0.15 0.16 
Host country level controls                    
Minority shareholder protection index       0.26 0.28 0.16 0.18  0.30 0.33 -0.48 -0.46 0.38 0.41 0.20 0.22 
Cultural distance       4.68 4.88 3.66 3.77  3.40 3.51 5.08 5.19 3.49 3.60 3.70 3.81 
Geographical distance (thousand)       0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Linguistic distance       -0.18 -0.18 -0.09 -0.09  -0.08 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
Corruption distance       -2.42 -2.41            
Country risk       0.19 0.19            
Emerging market       6.51 6.90            
Moderator variable                    
Institutional distance         -1.01 -1.04  -1.02 -1.05 -1.28 -1.31 -1.00 -1.03 -0.98 -1.01 
Interactive effects                    
Institutional distance X Ratio of inside directors            -8.01* -8.09*       
Institutional distance X Ratio of independent 
directors 
           
 
 12.82* 12.82*     
Institutional distance X Ratio of family directors                6.96* 7.01*   
Institutional distance X Ratio of equity stake held 
by family directors 
                 0.17** 0.17** 
Constant 78.33** 78.30** 81.92** 81.76** 83.77** 83.66** 63.15* 62.06* 77.71** 77.28**  77.59** 77.15** 76.90** 76.48** 77.17** 76.72** 77.80** 77.37** 
F 10.44**  10.83**  7.88**  4.69**  5.29**   5.16**  5.27**  5.19**  5.57**  
Adjusted R2 0.15  0.20  0.20  0.19  0.19   0.20  0.20  0.20  0.21  
LR χ2  48.28**  68.33**  71.35**  74.08**  73.08**   75.95**  77.37**  76.42**  81.20** 
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01. 
